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CHAPTER 1 
 
        INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The growing popularity of North American professional sports over the last 
twenty years directly coincides with the recent trend of urban communities using tax 
dollars to publically subsidize professional football, baseball, and basketball stadiums. 
Communities across North America invest substantial amount of public tax dollars in 
private facilities in light of a consensus among policy analysts that the economic impact 
of the stadium is greatly exaggerated.1  Sports Economist argue that the actual economic 
impact of sports teams in terms of creating new jobs, generating individual spending, 
increasing county tax revenues and attracting new business is too small to justify the 
large public expenditure for the stadium subsidies.2  
In North America the three dominant professional sports leagues in terms of 
overall league revenue are the National Football League; Major League Baseball; and the 
National Basketball Association. With the exception of the Green Bay Packers who 
operate as the only community owned franchise, professional sports teams in North 
America are privately owned.  As private entities sports teams are not obligated to 
disclose their financial statements making it difficult to know exactly how profitable 
                                                          
1
  3.  Kevin Delaney and Rick Eckstein, Public Dollars, Private Stadiums: The Battle Over Building Sports 
Stadiums (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003). 
2
  Robert Baade, Richard Dye. “ The impact of stadiums and professional sports on metropolitan area 
development." Growth & Change 21, no. 2 (Spring 1990).  2-5. 
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owning a professional sports team really is. The now defunct Financial World magazine 
published estimates of operating profits and franchise valuations from 1991 to 1998.  In 
1999 Forbes magazine started publishing the figures in their sports economics’ section.  
Estimates of overall league revenue consistently rank the National Football League, 
Major League Baseball and National Basketball Association as the most lucrative sports 
leagues in the world3. 
 
 
        Figure 1.  Estimated 2010 Overall League Revenue in Billions  
 
 
Public subsidies for the professional sports teams are a relatively new 
phenomenon beginning in the early 1990’s. In the past sixty years professional sports 
have undergone a transformation emerging as a national obsession in the flourishing post 
World War II economy. In the 1950’s, professional football and baseball teams generally 
played in dual purpose privately financed stadiums, equally distributing stadium related 
revenue between teams.   The primary revenue source came almost entirely within the 
                                                          
3
 "CHART OF THE DAY: NFL Players And Owners Are Fighting Over The Biggest Pie In Sports Read 
more: http://www.businessinsider.com/nfl-biggest-pie-in-sports-2011-3#ixzz1KM9dpnCV". Business 
Insider. http://www.businessinsider.com/nfl-biggest-pie-in-sports-2011-3. Retrieved 23 April 2011. 
9
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stadium from ticket sales, limited stadium advertising and concessions. In the 1960’s 
individual teams began signing lucrative broadcasting contracts that collectively 
strengthened the leagues.  During the 1970’s, broadcasting revenues in the large markets 
surpassed stadium revenue although overall league revenue was still dominated by ticket 
sales and concessions.   A new trend emerged in the 1980’s when owners identified 
alternative revenue streams most notably the improvement of concession and sports 
memorabilia available within the stadium4.   Team owners found that fans were willing to 
pay for improved quality and quantity of concessions and the providers were willing to 
compete to have access to the stadiums and fans.  
 The last twenty years of professional sports have seen unprecedented growth 
attributed primarily to lucrative broadcasting contracts and new concession revenue. With 
the growth a disproportional amount of new stadiums have been built.   Beginning in 
1990 fifty Major League Baseball, National Football League and National Basketball 
Association teams have the constructed new facilities.  The cost of the new facilities in 
the three sports eclipsed twelve billion dollars with approximately 65 percent of the funds 
coming from public subsides5.  
The phenomenon of publically subsidizing facilities for professional sports teams 
is the direct result of the team’s favorable negotiating leverage with the local 
governments because of scarcity of franchises controlled by the leagues monopolistic 
                                                          
4
 Delaney, Kevin, and Rick Eckstein. Public dollars, private stadiums:  the battle over building sports 
stadiums. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 24-25 
5
 Appendix A B and C  
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power, and the institutional alliances between local corporate advocacy groups,  and local 
government.  
Public subsidies for private stadiums have emerged largely because professional 
sports leagues are capable of acting as monopolies artificially controlling the location and 
existence of the individual teams.  The market structure of the leagues allows them to 
restrict the number of teams, which is significantly less than cities that are capable of 
supporting a franchise.  In all three major sports the leagues allow teams to veto the 
creation of new franchises or the movement of existing teams into their market areas. In 
economic terms, Noll and Zimbalist (1997) identify how the league can control supply 
regardless of consumer demand, which further increases the value of the restricted 
commodity6.  
Professional sports teams like businesses are mobile and are constantly looking to 
maximum profit enriching the owners.  This business practice allows teams to shop local 
jurisdictions for the most desirable public subsidy increasing revenue from a new 
stadium. Owners are able to exert control over the timing and process of their threatened 
moves giving them an absolute advantage when dealing with local governments and 
communities7.  
According to Delaney and Eckstein: 
The only certain effective way to give cities and taxpayers a level 
playing field in their negotiations with sports teams and leagues is to have 
                                                          
6
 Noll, Roger and Andrew Zimbalist. Sports, jobs, and taxes: the economic impact of sports teams and 
stadiums. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 237.  
7
 Clyde Brown and David Paul “Local Organized Interest and the 1996 Cincinnati Sports Stadia Tax    
Referendum,” Journal of Sports & Social Issues 23, no 2 (1999) : 221-224  
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a larger supply of teams. This means changing the fundamental structure 
of our professional sports industries. The competitive ideal even allowing 
for the necessary cooperative decision making that is required to schedule 
a contest agree upon rules and keep records, would mean more team in 
more cities a wider range of viewing options for fans and some 
redistribution of league profits back to cities and taxpayers.8   
    
Cities have largely accepted that they must provide teams with new publically 
subsidized facilities or lose the franchise to other communities willing to spend public 
dollars.  Sports teams operating in new facilities today generally pay little or no rent, are 
given most or all parking revenue and naming right to the stadium, and are in a few cases 
given ticket sale guarantees by the city.9  The standard financial plan cities propose to the 
teams divide the stadium construction expenditure in three components; payments to be 
paid directly by team owners out of their pocket; those to be financed through upfront 
payments such as naming rights, special seat license, and sale of luxury boxes; and those 
to be paid initially from a budget or sale of bonds approved by the local government10.  
When a team rarely becomes available through expansion or relocation the league is able 
to create a situation of competitive bidding from several potential cities giving the 
individuals teams a substantial negotiating advantage over the local governments.  
Teams owners initiate the negotiation process between the team and local 
government by publically demanding public subsidies and strengthen their position by 
threaten to relocate the team if their demands are not meet.  Although the teams are the 
                                                          
8
 Delaney and Eckstein, 108 
9
 Roger and Zimbalist, 28.  
10
 Ibid., 30.  
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direct recipients of the subsidies it is the indirect beneficiaries that prove instrumental in 
supporting, campaigning and securing the public subsidy.  The advocacy group who 
support the subsidy are dominated by local corporations composed of elite CEO’s who 
influence the political process and utilize resources at their disposal to fund the 
campaigns. The advocacy groups are less interested in public policy and favor large 
visible projects that will attract new corporations and dollars to the city.  Corporate 
advocates see the stadiums with luxury boxes and club seating as a necessary recruiting 
tools. Because the corporate groups receive no direct benefits from the subsidy they have 
a greater incentive to lobby and support the subsidy projects.  
The corporate advocacy groups generally use two strategies for why local 
communities should spend public dollars on the construction of new facilities.  The first 
claim is that new stadiums will provide tangible economic benefits to the local 
community. The second claims that the new stadiums will augment the way the 
community views itself, and how others perceive the community 11.    Roger and 
Zimbalist (1997) found the most effective path to a new publically subsidized stadium is 
to have a unified corporate advocacy group that emphasizes ways in which the stadium 
will enhance community self esteem and community collective conscience12.  The 
advocacy organizations success relies on corporate and political relationships to devise a 
tax proposal, and privately fund the campaign.  
                                                          
11
 Roger and Zimbalist, 35-43.  
12
 Ibid.,35 
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Whenever public subsides are proposed for private stadiums there is a strong 
community resistance. Anti-tax supporters and community activist agree that public 
expenditure on sports displaces resources needed elsewhere in the community and absorb 
scare government funds which ought to be used for either tax reductions or programs 
having a higher social or economic payoff13.  Under the fundamental principle of taxation 
the financial contribution for a public service should be a function of the benefits 
received for the constituents. The opposition argues that the economic activity generated 
by the sports team is relatively small given the large public investment required, and the 
types of jobs beyond the initial construction effort are low paying and seasonal14.  The 
subsidization of stadiums is commonly referred to as corporate welfare, and team owners 
were personified as greedy and tightfisted with their own money.  
Economist has consistently reported that stadium projects are poor investments 
unworthy of public sector efforts and dollars.  The projects simply redirect spending from 
one activity to another producing only a small increase in economic activity and any jobs 
created are low paying service jobs. Despite the overwhelming research showing the 
economic impacts of the sports facilities fail to deliver the purposed economic benefits, 
North American metropolitan cities continue to build new sports facilities using public 
funds15. The irony behind the publically financed stadiums is that the average citizens 
who’s tax dollars end up paying for the stadiums are the least likely to benefit from the 
                                                          
13
  DeMause,Neil and Joanna Cagan, Field of schemes:  how the great stadium swindle turns public money 
into private profit.( Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008) 55 
14
 Brown and Paul, 23 
15
 Roger and Zimbalist, 45-48. 
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new facility.   New designs for stadiums tend to focus on adding luxury suites and club 
seats intended for individual season tickets or corporate entertainment16.  
The direct economic impact on communities when publically funded facilities are 
built at the expense of the taxpayer has been extensively recorded. The focus of this paper 
is to examine the impact publically subsidized facilities built in the last twenty years have 
on the overall team valuation compared to teams with no public subsidy or no new stadia.  
When owners of private teams align themselves with the business interest of 
corporate advocacy groups and utilize the bargaining advantage secured by the scarcity of 
teams I believe the overall valuation of the teams will prove to be more lucrative for team 
owners than when no new stadiums are constructed or stadiums are privately financed.  
Each political process between the team and local government is unique structuring the 
deals differently.  The following two chapters examine the political process and type of 
public subsidy given to the Cincinnati Bengals, Cleveland Indians, and Cleveland 
Cavaliers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Roger and Zimbalist,141.  
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CHAPTER 2 
CINCINATTI 
 
Beginning in the early 1990’s, Cincinnati Bengals Owner Mike Brown voiced his 
complaints about Riverfront Stadium, the thirty-year-old multipurpose facility the 
Bengals currently shared with the Cincinnati Reds.  Brown announced his team was 
losing money and the only way the team would remain in Cincinnati was if a new larger 
stadium was built with public subsides. Brown took his concerns to the city 
commissioners and lobbied for a new publically financed stadium which would generate 
revenue with added luxury suites and club seats giving the Bengals necessary resources 
to compete with other football franchises in free agency.  
 Four years later, with no stadium plans underway, Brown escalated the conflict 
filling a lawsuit against the city which was settled when the city agreed to give the team 
an additional 2.75 million dollars per year for the next four years and promised to build 
additional luxury suites and club seats at Riverfront Stadium.   As part of the settlement 
the city renegotiated the terms of the Bengals lease and agreed to have a new stadium in 
the works by 199817. 
                                                          
17
 Delaney, Kevin, and Rick Eckstein. Public dollars, private stadiums:  the battle over building sports 
stadiums. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 66-69. 
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Shortly after securing the additional payments from the city, Brown publically 
announced that the team was being courted by four other cities willing to publically 
finance a new stadium. Brown specifically acknowledged that Maryland had agreed in 
principal to publically finance a two hundred and fifty million dollar single purpose 
stadium in an attempt to lure the franchise from Cincinnati to Baltimore.   Days after 
Brown’s latest announcement about the Maryland offer, first term Hamilton County 
Commissioner Bob Bedinghaus proposed a unique financing plan to fund a new football 
stadium. The plan called for a twenty-year sales tax increase of one cent, which would 
pay for the 540 million dollar sports complex, a 300 bed county jail, a small subsidy for a 
911 emergency communication center, and a 18% reduction in property taxes (table 1).  
The twenty year tax increase in the Bedinghaus plan was the longest and most expensive 
sports project ever proposed in the United States, with a total public expenditure of over 
700 million with debt service18. The plan was also unique in that it was the first proposed 
tax increase that combined revenue raising measures with a reduction in property taxes.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 1. DeMause, Neil and Joanna Cagan, Field of schemes:  how the great stadium swindle turns public 
money into private profit.( Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008) 55 
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Table 1. Proposed New Revenue Expenditures Hamilton County Sales Tax19  
New Expenditure  Per    Percent of Tax 
 
 
Property Tax rollback     40.0 
Stadium Cost              35.0 
300 bed county jail               15.0 
Retirement of other long term debt                6.5 
Reduction in real estate transfer tax                2.0 
Subsidy for county commissions center operations                 1.5  
 
 
TOTAL              100.00 
 
Fearing that the city would reject the proposal Brown took aggressive action 
issuing an ultimatum on June 24 stating if a deal was not reached by June 29 he would 
begin exclusive negotiations with the Maryland Stadium Authority to move the Bengals 
to Baltimore20.  Faced with the option of publically subsidizing a new stadium or losing 
the franchise, Hamilton County commissioners voted 2-1 to pass two separate  .5 % sales 
tax increases.  Ohio law allows county governments to unilaterally piggyback .5 % 
increases on the state’s 5 % sales tax.21 
The county commissioned the University of Cincinnati to conduct an economic 
impact study of the proposed measure. The study found that the construction of the new 
stadium would bring the city a one time economic benefit of 1.13 billion, the annual 
economic impact of the Bengals operating in the new stadium would be 296 million, the 
                                                          
19
 Noll, Roger and Andrew Zimbalist. Sports, jobs, and taxes: the economic impact of sports teams and 
stadiums. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 291. 
20
 Clyde Brown and David Paul “Local Organized Interest and the 1996 Cincinnati Sports Stadia Tax    
Referendum,” Journal of Sports & Social Issues 23, no 2 (1999) 225.  
21
 Delaney and Eckstein. 45-49. 
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stadium would support 18,461 jobs, and about half of the sales tax increase would be paid 
by non Hamilton County residents (table 2)22. 
 
Table 2. Economic Impact of Proposed Stadium Funding Project  
Impact in millions Stadiums Parking  Infrastructure           
Total 
 
 
   
Direct spending 407.9    75.9 36.0 519.8 
Local spending 367.1 68.31 32.40 
          
467.82 
Indirect impact  525.48 91.90 45.46 
          
662.39 
Total Economic Impact 892.59 160.20 77.87 
       
1,130.66 
Number of jobs  14,648     2,582      1231 
          
18,461  
.  
 
The public subsidy plan was meet with strong opposition by anti tax groups, 
community activist and unified suburban leaders. The group Citizens for Choice in 
Taxation composed of anti-tax activist, union leaders, suburban government officials and 
Cincinnati City Council member Tom Luken was formed to lobby for the community 
opposing public subsidies for to the construction of the stadiums benefiting a handful of 
private individuals.  The Cincinnati Federation of Teachers joined the group opposing the 
tax increase arguing, that a large public expenditure towards the private stadium would 
make passing future legislature funding public school overwhelmingly difficult. A survey 
                                                          
22
 University of Cincinnati. Center for Economic Education. “The Effects of Construction, 
Operations and Financing of new Sports Stadium on Cincinnati Economic Growth.” January 2 1996 
14. 
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of nearly five thousand Cincinnati residents “found little support for public financing; 
nearly 60% opposed the construction of a new stadium for the Bengals, with 37 % 
favoring such a project; 17% supported the construction of a new stadium; and just 19 
%supported a tax increase to pay for such projects23.  The corporate business 
organizations were well aware of the increasing opposition and began to devise a plan to 
support the tax increase.  
Despite being a modest city of 350,000 residents, Cincinnati had an 
overwhelming corporate presence as six fortune five hundred companies were 
headquartered in the downtown area.  The Cincinnati Business Committee, an elite 
business organization composed of the city’s top twenty-six CEO’s, took the lead 
supporting the tax increase.  The Cincinnati Business Committee was formed in 1977 and 
closely aligned themselves with the local Chamber of Commerce.  The Cincinnati 
Business Committee made securing the public funds for the proposed stadium their main 
priority.  The group had a vested interest in projecting the city favorably to prospective 
clients and business personnel.   The group advocated that a midsized city such as 
Cincinnati needed to offer professional amenities to prospective upper level mangers and 
executives.24 
The group Citizens for Choice in Taxation was at a substantial disadvantage 
lacking the financial resources needed to properly fund a campaign. Nevertheless the 
group’s strategy was to appeal the impending tax increase and force a referendum.  The 
                                                          
23
 Clyde Brown, “The Campaign by Cincinnati Business Interest for Strong Mayors and Sports Stadia,” 
Journal of Sports and Social Issues 23, no 2 (March 1999) : 3-4. 
24
 Delaney and Eckstein, 50. 
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same state law that allowed the unilateral piggyback of the two separate .5 % increases 
also guaranteed that citizens could petition for a repeal of the referendum vote25. The 
anti-tax and community activist group lead by local attorney Tim Mara began the 
difficult process of appeal the referendum knowing that there had never successful tax 
repeal in Hamilton County history.  The group was met with overwhelming support and 
with the help of over 500 community volunteers collected 90,000 signatures in two weeks 
more than tripling the required amount of 27,000. The group’s successful petition forces 
a March 1996 referendum of the proposal.26 
Although a county commissioner was the visible spokesperson for the coalition in 
favor of new stadiums, it was the corporate community that provided the strategic 
guiding force as well as the funding in support of the referendum.   The Cincinnati 
Business Committee spent more than 1.1 million dollars promoting the sales tax increase 
while the Citizens for Choice in Taxation spent less than 30,000 trying to repeal the tax. 
The Bengals were they single largest campaign donors contributing more than 300,000 
defending the tax increase. The Cincinnati Business Committee financed a well funded 
campaign supporting the tax increasing as a civic investment retaining the vitality of the 
city keeping it from falling into the ranks of a second class city around the slogan “Keep 
Cincinnati a Major League City”.  . While the anti tax group was supported by 
individuals and relied on small financial contributions from the community.  The unity 
                                                          
25
 Brown and Paul, 227. 
26
 Brown and Paul, 225 
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and support of the corporate community in Cincinnati for raising the sales tax to fund 
new stadiums was essential to the success of the campaign.  
Ultimately the new proposal named passed with 61 % approval despite the initial 
opposition voiced by the local community. The Browns accepted the terms of the new 
deal and reassured the city council and voters of their commitment to the project by 
contributing 40 million dollars to the project. Of the forty million original pledged by the 
team to the project none would come directly from the pocket of owner Mike Browns, 
rather from future stadium generated revenue.  The team would contribute twenty five 
million dollars from revenue in permanent seat license and give the first five million 
dollars from the naming rights to the county.  The remaining ten million dollars would be 
covered using the twenty-five cent ticket surcharge.  
According to the agreement, officially Hamilton County would own the stadium 
and lease it to the Bengals for 20 years. The Bengals would pay the city 1.1 million 
dollars for the first ten years of the lease then the amount dropped to 1 dollar for the 
remaining 10 years.27  Hamilton County was responsible for paying the stadium 
operations and maintenance fees, while the Bengals received the revenues from tickets 
concession, parking, broadcasting rights, and half of the gate receipts for non-football 
events at the stadium.  Finally if the team did not sell 50,000 general admission tickets at 
                                                          
27
 Brown, 167-173. 
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each of its first twenty home games the county agreed to reimburse the Bengals for the 
revenue difference.28   
The Cincinnati Bengals played their first home game of the 2000 season in their 
brand new four hundred and fifty million dollar facility.  The private stadium was 
financed almost entirely by a .5% sales tax collected from the nine hundred thousand 
citizens of Hamilton County, Ohio. One sports executive familiar with the deal stated,  
The Bengals took the county to the cleaners. The net present value of the 
Bengals deal is negative. The county is paying them to stay. The county 
pays 100 percent of the maintenance and the Bengals get 100 percent of 
the revenues. The county pays all the real estate and property taxes. The 
stadium deal in Cincinnati is considered one of the most generous deals 
for any professional sports team in the last 20 years. 29 
 
The stadium deal in Cincinnati is considered one of the most favorable in the last 
twenty years using generous public subsidies to construct privately owned facilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 Delaney, Kevin, and Rick Eckstein. Public dollars, private stadiums:  the battle over building sports 
stadiums. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 45-49.  
29
 Delaney and Eckstein, 46.  
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CHAPTER 3 
CLEVELAND 
 
In 1973 Cleveland Browns owner Art Modell agreed to a twenty five year lease 
extension of Cleveland Stadium, paying the city 13.75 million dollars a year to continue 
playing at the dual purpose facility that the team shared with Major League Baseball’s 
Cleveland Indians.  Ten years after the initial agreement Modell demanded a new 
publically subsidized stadium arguing that a lack of luxury suit and club seat revenue was 
causing the franchise to lose money.  Fearing that the Browns would relocate, city 
government presented a proposal to the citizens of Cuyahoga County in 1984 to construct 
a domed stadium that would serve both the Browns and Indians. The referendum would 
fund construction of the new stadium with a countywide property taxes increase but 
failed with 65 percent of voters opposing the increase.  Unable to secure funding for the 
stadium through a public vote, the Maryland Stadium Authority designated 30 million 
dollars towards renovations primarily to the addition of luxury seating. 30 The Maryland 
Stadium Authority operating as a public corporation of the State was authorized to issue 
tax exempt bonds for financing its operations without the voter approval.   
                                                          
30
 DeMause, Neil and Joanna Cagan, Field of schemes:  how the great stadium swindle turns public money 
into private profit.( Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008) 10-12. 
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When Modell’s initial 20-year lease was set to expire he renegotiated a 30 year 
lease extension with the Stadium Authority. According to the agreement Modell’s newly 
formed Stadium Corporation, assumed responsibility from the city for facility expenses 
and gained control of stadiums operations.  The Bengals would play in the stadium rent-
free and were guaranteed the revenue from parking, concessions, advertising and any off-
season activities held at the facility.  Once the Stadium Corporation gained control of the 
facility their first order of business was constructing new luxury suites, club seats and a 
state of the art scoreboard.  Modell refused to share any of the new revenue generated by 
the privately financed renovations with the Cleveland Indians the stadiums other tenet. 
The Indians insisted that the city was favoring the football team by granting them all the 
luxury seat revenue and demanded a publically subsidized stadium where they could 
control the luxury suites and club seating revenue. 
The city eventually agreed in principal to the Gateway Project that by 1997 would 
construct Jacobs field for the Indians and Gund Arena for the NBA’s Cleveland 
Cavaliers. Initially Modell believed that his revenues would not be endangered when the 
Indians left, but shortly after, requested an issue be placed on the ballot to provide a 175 
million dollar tax subsidy to renovate Cleveland Stadium. The county refused to 
accommodate his request and Modell announced later that year during the 1995 football 
season that he had signed a deal to relocate the team to Baltimore.  
After the announcement and impending departure of the Browns, Cleveland was 
an aging Midwestern city desperate to retain their remaining professional sports teams. 
Cleveland Tomorrow, an exclusive organization comprised the cities top 50 CEO’s, 
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concerned that the city would no longer remain a desirable corporate location and became  
involved in the Gateway Project. Thomas Vail the publisher of the local newspaper the 
Plain Dealer and founder of Cleveland Tomorrow reflected on the organizations 
beginnings; 
“It started in the early 1980’s aimed broadly at economic development and 
economic growth of the region.  It was an organization keyed up by a study done 
by a consultant who was contracted by a group of four or five CEO’s in town, 
who said “We are Rust Belt; we are sliding; we need an assessment of where our 
big gaps are because of economic competiveness.’ Cleveland really doesn’t have 
a strategic, powerful, business oriented organization to do this. These Issues are 
not falling fully within the Chamber of Commerce; they are not fully public 
agency types of task. We need an organization with some clout to take on these 
Strategies31. 
 
Cleveland Tomorrow made securing public financing for the stadium their top 
priority.  Similarly to the Cincinnati Business Committee, Cleveland Tomorrow saw the 
new stadium as a way to enhance the communities image, helping companies recruit top 
personnel, and provide some economic spin off for their own corporations.32 Tom 
Chema, a local lawyer, was appointed the head of the stadium coalition and along with 
the CEO’s of Cleveland Tomorrow proposed the Gateway Project.   The project would 
include an indoor basketball arena and baseball stadium located in downtown Cleveland. 
Using focus groups commissioned by the governor, Chema found that the public 
overwhelmingly opposed a sales or property tax increase, however they were moderately 
supportive of publically financing the project if the funds came from a “sin” tax on 
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alcohol and tobacco. According to Chema the a sin tax would bring in an estimated 16 
million in the first year of implementation and decline over time, with the assumption 
that the higher tax and other social trends might decrease alcohol and tobacco sales33. 
Chema spent close to a year convincing city commissioners that the sin tax would 
generate an economic resurgent in the downtown area.  The proposal was ultimately 
placed on the ballot in 1990.  At election time the Gateway proposal had an estimated 
cost of 344 million (Figure 3), which Chema would later acknowledge, was just a guess. 
In an interview he admitted,  
It is stupid to say a figure because I didn’t know. I didn’t have a clue what 
this project was going to cost because we had no money no organization nothing. 
I didn’t have a design, all I knew was that in Chicago and Baltimore they were 
building stadiums for a certain amount. I took the numbers and ramp it up for 
inflation for a couple of years and I take a look at labor cost in those cities 
compared to Cleveland and I put in a function for labor and throw in 20 million 
for property and voila I get 344 million.34 
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Table 3.  Original Financial Plan for the Gateway project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After the announcement of the proposed tax increase, early pools showed 
considerable opposition to the proposal. Citizens in neighborhoods outside the downtown 
area did not want to see their tax dollars go toward the private stadium rather they 
generally preferred the money be spent on quality of life projects such as parks, 
sanitation, public safety and improved school35. The poor quality of the public schools 
was an especially important civic issue in Cleveland. According to some estimates the 
                                                          
35
 Delaney and Eckstein, 75 
Source of cost and revenues Amount (in 
millions) 
Anticipated cost 
 
 
Stadium construction 110 
Arena construction 223 
Land acquisition  197 
Land for future development 134 
Financing and working capital 202 
 
TOTAL 343.5  
 
Anticipated Revenues   
 
Total Private Investments  174 
     Luxury seats  99.0 
     Cleveland Tomorrow 20.0 
     Property loans 
     Interest earnings                                                                                         
Sin tax commitment 
38.5 
Total 343.5 
16.5 
169.
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schools were 150 million in debt and only 8 percent of Cleveland residents would 
eventually earn a college degree36. 
Opposition for the new tax increases also came from the United Auto Workers 
union, the tobacco and alcohol industries. The Auto Workers Union feared their 
manufacturing plants located close to the site of the proposed project would be seized by 
eminent domain.  The tobacco and alcohol industries were understandably concerned that 
the tax increase would jeopardize their future earning.  The proposal reaffirmed working 
class and poor Clevelanders suspicions that when it came to matters of public policy and 
decision making in the city, they were the  first effected because tobacco and liquor sales 
fall disproportionally on those with lower incomes.  In a trend shown in Cincinnati case 
study, the groups opposing the tax increase were disorganized with no united front. The 
lack of resources and political influence could not compare to corporate advocacy groups.  
Cuyahoga County commissioners approved a public private partnership to 
develop the Gateway Project. The 50/50 partnership included 174 million of privately 
financed commitments to the Gateway Project. To finance the public portion of the 344 
million developments the commissioners placed an initiative on the May 8 ballot seeking 
voter approval of small excise tax on the purchase of alcoholic beverages and cigarettes.37 
Ultimately, a well-run well financed campaign spearheaded by the corporate community 
convinced the voters that the project was in the community interest and the tax passed by 
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a narrowly 1.2 percent margin.38 Cleveland Tomorrow lead by Tom Cheam, acting as the 
main advocates and the city government were able to turn initial public sentiment against 
tax increase into a vote for tax increase.  
With public funding in place designs were completed for the new baseball 
stadium and basketball arena that increased from the election time estimate of 344 to 430 
million.  The Cleveland Cavaliers were primary responsible for the increase in cost 
because the team had been content in their arena in Richfield roughly halfway between 
Cleveland and Akron.  The Cavaliers Owners, the Gund brothers were hesitant to move 
back to the city because they would lose significant parking revenues.  The political 
realities made the Cavaliers indispensable to the entire project Chema knew who had the 
leverage. 39 
Another factor contributing to the increased cost was that the Cavaliers paid no 
rent for their first few years in the arena. The agreement gave the Cavaliers a yearly 
credit of 1.5 million dollars to compensate for potential losses in parking revenues 
resulting from moving back in the city.  The Cavaliers kept all the parking revenues from 
the new stadium and applied the yearly credit towards future rent payments. Eventually 
Gateway was unable to pay the bills. There simply was not enough sin tax revenue to 
cover the soaring cost of the project. On December 15,1995 the Cleveland Plain Dealer 
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reported the total cost would be 148 million which represented a 97.3 percent overrun of 
the original figure approved by votes.40 
 
Table 4. Characteristics of Gund Arena and Jacobs Field 41 
Characteristic  Gund Arena Jacobs Field  
 
 
 
Start date    1991 1991 
 
Opening date    1994 1994 
 
Seating capacity   20,562      42,865 
 
Club seats    2,000 
 
2,04 
Suites          92      
122 
Estimated cost (millions)         75      
128 
Final estimated cost (millions)       157      
180 
Overrun (percent)    109.3      
40.6 
Team Investment (millions)      41.6      
63.5  
   
 
Eventually Gateway was unable to pay the bills. There simply was not enough sin 
tax revenue to cover the soaring cost of the project. Contractors were not getting paid and 
many joined together in lawsuit against Gateway Project, the City of Cleveland, and 
Cuyahoga County, alleging fraud because Gateway was approving expenditures when the 
                                                          
40
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board knew it as out of money.  The unpaid bills increased from 12 million to 18 million 
in just a few months, and after six additional months an internal accounting audit 
concluded that the total amount of unpaid bills would be 30 million42. 
 When the losses surpass 30 million dollars Cuyahoga County was forced to slash 
its operating budget by 11 percent. In 1995 the a surging economy increased tax revenue 
generated by the county and as one official explains,  
Your cutting 11 percent where you really needed 9 and the tax revenue are 
not growing. The economy went bang and took off so the county caught a break. 
It had a lot of cash and it just wrote a check. I won’t say we didn’t miss the 30 
million but the county was in a very good financial position.  
Orchestrated the allocation of public dollars for private stadia.43 
 
The Gateway Project is another example of how private owners used the threat of 
relocation to secure public financing for public stadiums. Corporate advocacy groups 
strategically aligned themselves as indirect beneficiaries of the public subsidy and 
successfully influenced tax initiatives through the local governments.  
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CHAPTER 4 
INDIVIDUAL LEAGUE SUBSIDY AND VALUATION DATA 
 
Major League Baseball 
 
 Founded in 1869, Major League Baseball is the highest level of professional 
baseball in the North America composed of thirty teams that play in the National and 
American League. The American League is contains of fourteen teams compared to 
sixteen in the National League.  Both leagues arrange the teams in the three subdivisions; 
Central, East, and West.  The American and National League began as independent rival 
corporate entities that meet in an end of the year championship called The World Series.  
Recently in 2000 the two separate legal entities were formally dissolved forming a single 
league.  
Starting in the early 1990’s, Major League Baseball saw a transformation building 
fourteen new publically financed stadiums for the professional teams benefiting the 
handful of principal owners.  The Los Angeles Dodgers and San Francisco Giants are the 
only two teams in the league that privately financed their new stadium in the past twenty 
years.  The remaining six professional baseball teams have had no new Stadium built in 
the last twenty years.  
 To examine how stadiums built with public subsidies increase in overall valuation 
over the past twenty years compared to teams with privately financed stadium or no new 
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stadium the league was divided into three categories;1 Teams with no New Stadium or 
Arena in last 20 years, 2 Teams with a new Stadium with no public subsidy,    3 Teams 
with a new publically subsidized stadium.  By calculating the average per team valuation 
increase and actual average dollar increase for each of the three categories the I can 
compare the figures in the three categories to answer if teams with publically financed 
stadiums valuations increase faster than those with privately financed or no new stadium 
at all.  
 
Table 5.  Major League Baseball Valuation 1991- 2009 
 
1991 Valuation      2009 Valuation      Percent Change     Dollar Increase 
                 (millions)    (millions)          (Per Team)    (Total)      (Average) 
MLB   
1    850 (6 teams)    3435  302 %   304 %       430 
 2    260 (2 teams)     1188  388 %   356 %      464 
 3   1415 (14 teams)     5813  317 %   310%      314 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Key  1= No New Stadium or Arena in last 20 years    2= New Stadium or Arena with no public subsidy     
3= New Stadium or Arena with Public Subsidy  
 
    The six teams with no new stadium constructed in the past 20 years, had the 
lowest per team average valuation increase of 302 percent with an average dollar increase 
of 430 million per team from 1991 to 2009.  The fourteen teams that have built a new 
stadium in the last twenty years with publically subsidy had a per team average valuation 
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increase of 317 percent and the average dollar increase of 314 million per team. The Los 
Angeles Dodgers and San Francisco Giants who privately financed their new stadia 
recorded the highest per team valuation increase of 388 percent as well as the most 
valuable dollar increase average of 464 million per team.  
 
 
Figure 2. Major League Baseball Valuations Over Time  
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
1991          Year Valuations           2009
MLB Valuations Over Time 
MLB No New Stadium or Arena in last 20 years (6 teams)
MLB  New Stadium  with no public subsidy (2 teams)
MLB New Stadium or Arena with Public Subsidy (14 teams) 
In
cr
e
a
se
 i
n
 T
e
a
m
 V
a
lu
a
ti
o
n
s 
 (
M
il
li
o
n
s)
 
  
  
 
33
National Football League 
 
 The National Football League founded in 1920 is the highest level of American 
Football in the United States.  The league consists of thirty two teams divided into the 
American Football Conference and National Football Conference.  Each conference is 
divided into four division containing four teams each.  The National Football League is 
the most attended sports leagues in world with an average fan attendance of 66,960 per 
game.  The National Football leagues television and radio rights are the most lucrative 
sports broadcasting commodity in the United States with the Super Bowl consistently 
ranking as the most watched television show of the year.  
Similar to the analysis of Major League Baseball to examine how stadiums built 
with public subsidies overall valuation increased over the past twenty years compared to 
teams with privately financed stadium or no new stadium the league was divided into 
three categories;1 Teams with no New Stadium or Arena in last 20 years, 2 Teams with a 
new Stadium with no public subsidy,    3 Teams with a new publically subsidized 
stadium.   
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Table 6 National Football League Valuations 1991-2009 
 
     1991 Valuation    2009 Valuation     Percent Change   Dollar Increase 
     (millions)       (millions)      (Per Team)     (Total)      (Average ) 
 1  1856   (13 teams)               13,597             651 %     632%     903 
 2   260   (2 teams)         2,364              886. %    806% 1052  
 3  1488  (12 teams)            12,612  752. %    747%   927  
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Key  1= No New Stadium or Arena in last 20 years    2= New Stadium or Arena with no public subsidy     
3= New Stadium or Arena with Public Subsidy  
 
 The National Football League teams had the most dramatic increase of the three 
leagues examined.  The thirteen teams with no new stadia in the last 20 years had the 
least per team average valuation increase of 651 percent with a dollar average dollar 
increase of 903 million per team.  The twelve teams with new publically subsidized 
stadia had an per team average valuation increase of 752 percent and a average dollar 
increase of 927 million per team. Lastly the two teams with privately funded stadia had 
the highest per team average valuation increase of 886 percent with an average dollar 
increase of 927 million per team.  
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 Figure 3. National Football Valuation Over Time  
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National Basketball Association 
 
 The National Basketball Association founded in 1946 is the highest level 
professional basketball in North America.  The leagues consist of thirty franchised clubs, 
twenty nine in the United States and the Toronto Raptors in Canada. The thirty teams in 
the National Basketball Association are divided into two conferences the Eastern and 
Western Conferences.  Within each of the two conferences are three divisions with five 
teams each.  During the regular season each team plays 82 games, 41 at home and 41 
away.  The National Basketball Association is the newest of the three major North 
American professional sports leagues studied.  
Again to examine how stadiums built with public subsidies overall valuation 
increased over the past twenty years compared to teams with privately financed stadium 
or no new stadium the league was divided into three categories; 1 Teams with no New 
Stadium or Arena in last 20 years, 2 Teams with a new Stadium with no public subsidy,    
3 Teams with a new publically subsidized stadium.   
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Table 7. National Basketball Association Valuation 1991-2009 
 
1991 Valuation        2009 Valuation    Percent Change   Dollar Increase 
     (millions)     (millions) (Per Team)     (Total)      (Average) 
         
 1 406 (5 teams)         2012     448 %  394%       321 
 2 269 (3 teams)         1097      497 % 306%         276 
 3 1135 (17 teams)     6606      562% 482 %         321  
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Key  1= No New Stadium or Arena in last 20 years    2= New Stadium or Arena with no public subsidy    
 3= New Stadium or Arena with Public Subsidy  
 
 The National Basketball Association has the least valuable franchise on average 
of the three professional teams studied.  The five teams with no new stadia for the past 
twenty years had a per team average valuation increase of 448 percent with a actual 
average dollar increase of 321 million. The three teams with privately financed stadia had 
a per team average valuation increase of 497 percent and an actual average dollar 
increase of 276 from 1991 until 2009. Lastly the seventeen teams with new stadium built 
with public subsidies had the highest per team average valuation increase of 562 percent 
and a average actual dollar increase of 321 million.  
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Figure 4. National Basketball Association Valuation Over Time   
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CONCLUSION 
  
This paper examined the relationship between types of public stadium subsides 
and professional sport overall valuations for the past twenty years. Valuation estimates 
were gathered from 1991 until 2009 for each individual team in the three most lucrative 
professional sports leagues in the world; the National Football League, Major League 
Baseball, and National Basketball Association.  The fundamental question was whether 
teams with publically subsidized stadiums increase in valuation more than teams with 
privately financed stadium.   
  Chapters 2 and 3 focused on the political process behind the new stadium 
initiatives not just their outcomes.  In both cases the sports team who had the most the 
gain financially did not lead the battles to build the facilities. The generous subsides in 
both Cincinnati and Cleveland are examples of how non sports corporations can 
obfuscate their vested interest in the public subsidy and advocate the communities 
interest. It is clear that publically subsidized sports facilities do not exists because they 
are financially valuable assets in their own, they exists because most cities have decided 
that a subsidized team is better than no team at all.  
 To examine how stadiums built with public subsidies increase in overall valuation 
over the past twenty years compared to teams with privately financed stadium or no new 
stadium the league was divided into three categories;1 Teams with no New Stadium or 
Arena in last 20 years, 2 Teams with a new Stadium with no public subsidy,    3 Teams 
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with a new publically subsidized stadium.  By calculating the average per team valuation 
increase and for each of the three categories the I was able to test my hypothesis to 
answer if teams with publically financed stadiums valuations increase faster than those 
with privately financed stadium. 
 For Major League Baseball  
The average valuation increase for teams with publically subsidized stadiums was 
302 percent compared to 388 percent increase for teams with privately financed stadiums, 
which rejected my hypothesis 
For the National Football League 
The average valuation increase for teams with publically subsidized stadiums was 
651 percent compared to 886 percent increase for teams with privately financed stadiums 
once again rejecting my hypothesis. 
For National Basketball Association  
The average valuation increase for teams with publically subsidized stadiums was 
562 percent compared to 497 percent increase for teams with privately financed stadiums, 
which was the only league that confirmed my hypothesis. 
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For All Leagues 
The average valuation increase for teams with publically subsidized stadiums was 
590 percent compared to 543 percent increase for teams with privately financed stadiums, 
which rejected my hypothesis.  
 
Table 8. MLB,NFL, and NBA Average Valuation 1991-2009  
 1991 Valuation        2009 Valuation      Percent Change    Dollar Increase  
 
(million)       (million)            (Per Team)         (Total)      (Million)  
  
 1          3112 (24 teams) 19044  467%  443%     551 
 2 789 (7 teams)  4649  590%  489%     506 
 3 4038  (43 teams) 24401  543%  513%     520 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Key  1= No New Stadium or Arena in last 20 years    2= New Stadium or Arena with no public subsidy     
3= New Stadium or Arena with Public Subsidy  
 
From the case studies it is clear that when owners of private teams align 
themselves with the business interest of corporate advocacy groups and utilize the 
bargaining advantage secured by the scarcity of teams they are able to secure public 
subsidies for new stadiums. While the teams with public subsidy did not have a greater 
percent change increase as much as those with privately financed the stadium, every 
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league the valuation increase percent change was greater when teams had a new stadium 
with public subsides than when teams had no new stadium. 
For Major League Baseball  
The average valuation increase for teams with publically subsidized stadiums was 
302 percent compared to 317 percent increase for teams with no new stadium in the past 
20 years. 
For the National Football League 
The average valuation increase for teams with publically subsidized stadiums was 
651  percent compared to 752 percent increase for teams with no new stadium in the past 
20 years. 
For National Basketball Association  
The average valuation increase for teams with publically subsidized stadiums was 
562 percent compared to 448 percent increase for teams with no new stadium in the past 
20 years. 
For All Leagues 
The average valuation increase for teams with publically subsidized stadiums was 
543 percent compared to 467 percent increase for teams with no new stadium in the past 
20 years. 
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Figure 9. Percent Change in Valuation From 1991-2009 
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APPENDIX A 
Professional Sports Team Valuation over Time 
1991 Valuation            2009 Valuation       Percent Change      Dollar Increase  
      (million)   (million)      (Per Team)      (Total)          (Average ) 
MLB   
1          850 (6 teams)  3435  302. %         304 %      430 
 2 260 (2 teams)   1188  388. %         356 %           464 
 3 1415 (14 teams)  5813  317. %         310%           314 
NFL 
 1 1856  (13 teams)  13597     651.%         632%               903 
 2  260 (2 teams)        2,364   886. %         806%             1052  
 3 1488 (12 teams)  12,612   752. %         747%        927  
NBA 
 1  406 (5 teams)   2012    448. %          394%     321 
 2 269 (3 teams)   1097  497. %         306%      276 
 3 1135 (17 teams)  6606  562.%         482 %       321  
ALL 3 Sports 
 1            3112 (24 teams) 19044  467%         443%    551 
 2 789 (7 teams)  4649  590%        489%    506 
 3 4038  (43 teams) 24401  543%        513%   520 
Key  
1= No New Stadium or Arena in last 20 years 
2= New Stadium or Arena with no public subsidy 
3= New Stadium or Arena with Public Subsidy  
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